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1 
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE 
  Amici are professors and scholars who teach and 
write on economic theory and method, particularly 
with respect to natural resources and the 
environment. Amici have an interest in seeing that 
the Court is informed on the appropriate use of 
economic analysis in the implementation of § 316(b) 
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1326(b), commonly referred to as the Clean Water 
Act (CWA).  
  The end of this brief summarizes the amici’s 
qualifications and affiliations. Amici file this brief 
solely as individuals and not on behalf of the 
institutions with which they are affiliated.1 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  This brief discusses the roles of various forms of 
economic analysis. Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) aims 
to identify allocatively efficient actions. Economists, 
however, have developed other forms of analysis for 
other purposes. Administrative agencies concerned 
about technology’s economic availability have 
 
  1 The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No 
counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and 
no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to 
fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other 
than amici, their institutions, or their counsel made a monetary 
contribution to its preparation or submission. 
2 
employed economic models that compare costs, not to 
benefits, but to regulated firm’s financial capabilities 
to predict whether regulated firms can afford the best 
technology. This brief discusses the relationship of 
financial, cost-benefit, and cost effectiveness analysis 
to EPA’s task as an agent of the elected legislature 
carrying out the instructions issued in § 316(b) of the 
CWA, concerning the regulation of cooling water 
intake. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 
430 U.S. 112, 138 (1976) (describing the question 
before the Court as “what Congress intended for these 
regulations,” not “what a court thinks . . . generally 
appropriate to the regulatory process”) [emphasis in 
original].  
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
  Electricity generating plants often withdraw 
water from rivers, lakes, and other waterways in 
order to manage excess heat generated during their 
production processes. EPA estimates that cooling 
water intake kills over 3.4 billion fish and shellfish 
(expressed as “age 1 equivalents”) by either trapping 
organisms against components of the cooling water 
intake structure or drawing them into the cooling 
water system itself. Pet.App.170a-172a (69 Fed. Reg. 
at 41,586).2 These two mortality threats, referred to 
 
  2 Citations to Pet.App. refer to the appendix filed in No. 
07-588. 
3 
as “impingement” and “entrainment,” affect not only 
the various fish and shellfish species for which EPA 
has been able to generate quantitative estimates, but 
also certain threatened and endangered species, such 
as sea turtles, Chinook salmon, and steelhead, as well 
as immeasurable quantities of phytoplankton and 
zooplankton that lie at the base of aquatic food 
chains. Moreover, impingement and entrainment are 
only the most obvious and measurable adverse effects 
of cooling water intake on aquatic ecosystems.  
  Cognizant of these kinds of informational 
difficulties, Congress in § 316(b) mandated that “the 
location, design, construction, and capacity of cooling 
water intake structures [must] reflect the best 
technology available for minimizing adverse 
environmental impact.” 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b). In 1995, 
EPA agreed to a consent decree that required the 
agency to establish cooling water intake rules in 
multiple phases. See Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 
F.3d 174, 181 (2d Cir. 2004) (Riverkeeper I); 
Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(Riverkeeper II). 
  Phase I, involving new facilities, generally 
required facilities to achieve environmental 
performance standards based on what is known as 
“closed-cycle cooling technology,” a process in which 
cooling water is recycled and only periodically 
replenished from neighboring waterways, rather than 
continuously withdrawn and discharged. Although 
environmentalists had argued on behalf of a more 
stringent “dry cooling technology,” the Second Circuit 
4 
accepted EPA’s conclusion that the expense of this 
technology rendered it not reasonably available to 
industry. See Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 195-96; 
Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 99 n.11. 
  Phase II involved large existing power plants. 
EPA’s final regulations for this phase set forth a 
complicated array of compliance options that were 
built around a set of impingement and entrainment 
performance standards. According to EPA’s own 
analysis, the Phase II rules allowed many facilities 
to avoid water intake reductions altogether. See 
EPA, Economic and Benefits Analysis for the Final 
Section 316(b) Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, 
EPA-821-R-04-005, February 2004, at D1-1 (Final 
Rule EBA).3 Even where the rules required reductions, 
they formally mandated no more than 80 and 60 
percent reductions, respectively, in impingement and 
entrainment. See Pet.App.189a-190a (69 Fed. Reg. at 
41,590); Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 105-08. EPA 
identified no single technology as the best available 
technology and offered no specific rationale for these 
numbers. See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 106. 
  Notably, EPA declined to use closed-cycle cooling 
technology as the benchmark against which other 
proposed protection measures might be evaluated. 
Despite acknowledging that impingement and 
 
  3 This document is available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
waterscience/316b/phase2/econbenefits/final.htm (last visited 
September 29, 2008). 
5 
entrainment provide the “primary and distinct types 
of harmful impacts associated with the use of cooling 
water intake structures,” Pet.App.226a (69 Fed. Reg. 
at 41,598), and that “closed-cycle, recirculating 
cooling towers . . . can reduce mortality from 
impingement by up to 98 percent and entrainment by 
up to 98 percent,” Pet.App.239a-240a (69 Fed. Reg. at 
41,601), EPA nevertheless adopted weaker standards. 
  The agency did so because it considered the cost 
of technologies in relation to the reductions in 
impingement mortality and entrainment achieved. 
Pet.App.250a (69 Fed. Reg. at 41,603). This 
efficiency-oriented approach had a significant effect 
on regulatory stringency: EPA estimated that 125 
facilities would adopt no impingement and 
entrainment controls at all under the Phase II rules. 
See Final Rule EBA, supra, at D1-1. Moreover, rather 
than up to 98 percent reduction in impingement and 
entrainment, as attained by closed-cycle cooling 
technology, the agency estimated that most facilities 
would only achieve between 30.9-59.0 percent 
reduction in impingement and between 16.4-47.9 
percent reduction in entrainment. Id. at C3-2.  
  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals remanded 
the Phase II regulations almost in their entirety. The 
basic defect of the rules, in the panel’s view, was 
EPA’s apparent decision to use CBA to identify the 
performance standard that could be attained by “the 
best technology available for minimizing adverse 
impact.” According to the Second Circuit, such 
best availability technology (BAT) requirements 
6 
necessitate a different implementation approach: 
Because “Congress itself [already has] defined the 
basic relationship between costs and benefits,” EPA’s 
responsibility is simply to identify the most 
environmentally protective technology available at a 
cost that can be “reasonably borne” by the regulated 
industry. Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 99 (quoting 
American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 
U.S. 490, 509 (1981)). 
  On April 14, 2008, this Court granted certiorari 
to determine “whether Section 316(b) of the Clean 
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1326(b), authorizes the [EPA] 
to compare costs with benefits in determining the 
‘best technology available for minimizing adverse 
environmental impact’ at cooling water intake 
structures.” See PSEG Fossil LLC v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 
128 S. Ct. 1867, 1868 (2008). 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
  Section 316(b) does not authorize CBA because 
the ratio of costs to benefits has no relevance to a 
decision about what constitutes the “best technology 
available for minimizing adverse environmental 
impacts.” 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b). Determination of which 
technology best minimizes negative environmental 
impacts requires a comparative engineering 
evaluation of competing technologies’ capacities to 
reduce environmental impacts. See Train, 430 U.S. 
at 131 (describing statutory provisions governing 
7 
technology-based water pollution rules as requiring 
an assessment of available technology’s 
“effectiveness”); Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. 
EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 475-76 (2004) (discussing EPA’s 
use of comparative “top-down” analysis to determine 
the “best available control technology” for air 
pollution). Under § 316(b), this engineering analysis 
focuses primarily on identifying technologies that 
minimize water intake that disrupt ecology and kill 
fish. Neither compliance cost nor its relationship to 
benefits is relevant to identification of the technology 
minimizing environmental impact.  
  Consideration of a technology’s economic 
availability requires an economic analysis that 
compares compliance costs to the financial resources 
of regulated firms, rather than comparing these costs 
to environmental benefits. To the extent that a 
technology proves so costly that an industry cannot 
afford to purchase it, it might be considered 
unavailable. See EPA v. National Crushed Stone 
Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 74 (1980) (describing maximizing 
technology’s use “within” an owner’s “economic 
capability” as a site-specific application of the best 
available technology concept). The dollar value of 
water quality benefits, however, does not bear on 
whether a technology is available, as a technology’s 
economic availability is solely a function of the 
relationship between costs and regulated firms’ 
finances.  
  Economic analysis should serve the 
decisionmakers’ legally appropriate goals. CBA 
8 
focuses on decisions about whether an environmental 
program is economically desirable in the abstract, a 
task that Congress often reserves for its own 
determination. See generally David M. Driesen, The 
Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond 
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 Ecology L. 
Q. 545, 605-13 (1997) (discussing CBA’s compatibility 
with a general legislative power). Since the elected 
legislature already has concluded that clean water is 
worth the necessary costs, it may rationally have 
assigned EPA the more limited role of deciding which 
available technologies maximize environmental 
protection. Cf. Alaska, 540 U.S. at 485 n.12 
(discussing similar Clean Air Act provisions); David 
M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, 
Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility 
Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory 
Reform, 32 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1, 19-21 (2005) 
(Feasibility Principle) (discussing similar provisions).  
  Elected representatives chose a BAT approach in 
order to maximize ecological restoration subject only 
to a technological availability constraint. The 
availability constraint addresses distributional 
concerns about plant shutdowns leading to 
unemployment, not concerns about net benefits. 
While CBA in principle supports efforts to identify 
allocatively efficient pollution levels, financial models 
provide appropriate tools for predicting whether 
pollution control costs might lead to plant shutdowns, 
instead of the employment increases that pollution 
control expenditures often produce. Cf. Eban 
9 
Goodstein, The Trade-Off Myth: Fact and Fiction 
About Jobs and the Environment 20 (1999) 
(associating environmental regulation with a small 
net increase in employment); Richard Morgenstern et 
al., Jobs Versus the Environment: An Industry-Level 
Perspective, 43 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 412, 413-14 
(2002) (finding environmental regulation likely 
increased employment modestly in the plastics, 
petroleum, steel, and pulp and paper industries). 
  Elected representatives may choose a BAT 
construct over CBA because of concerns about the 
feasibility of correlating costs and benefits in the 
water pollution context. CBA requires correlation of 
monetized marginal water quality benefits with the 
marginal cost of technologies. Because any 
technology’s effect on environmental quality varies 
with the quality of each relevant water body, water 
pollution control technology always yields important 
water quality benefits that cannot be quantified and 
vast uncertainties about those that can be. A BAT 
approach may be desirable precisely because it avoids 
the need to link environmental protection 
expenditures to marginal water quality benefits, as 
CBA demands.  
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
10 
ARGUMENT 
I. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IS A WELFARE 
ECONOMIC DECISION PROCEDURE 
  To understand why CBA has proven controversial 
in the environmental, health, and safety context – 
and to perceive why Congress might have eschewed 
EPA’s use of it in § 316(b) – it is necessary to know 
more about CBA than its surface resemblance to 
“common sense” or “basic rationality.”4 
 
 
  4 See, e.g., Brief for the Federal Parties (“Federal Brief”), at 
13 (“In everyday life, people routinely weight costs against 
benefits in deciding whether to do something.”); Brief of 
Petitioner Utility Water Act Group (“UWAG Br.”), at 28 (calling 
“irrational” any interpretation of § 316(b) that would prevent 
“translating . . . costs and benefits into economic terms for 
comparison”); UWAG Brief at 57 (“In the broadest sense, cost-
benefit balancing is a fundamental tool of logical 
decisionmaking.”); Brief of Petitioners Entergy Corp., PSEG 
Fossil LLC, and PSEG Nuclear, at 29 (“At a basic level, what 
respondents and the Second Circuit denigrate as ‘cost-benefit 
analysis’ is nothing more than common sense – the imperative of 
basic rationality that actions do more good than harm.”); Brief of 
Amici Curiae The AEI Center for Regulatory and Market 
Studies and 33 Individual Economists in Support of Petitioners, 
at 5 (“[A]s a general principle, regulators cannot make rational 
decisions unless they are allowed to compare costs and 
benefits. . . .”). 
11 
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis Aims to Identify 
Allocatively Efficient Regulation Based 
on Monetized Estimates of Policy 
Impacts on Human Well-Being 
  CBA serves as a tool for identifying allocatively 
efficient regulation, defined as regulation that 
generates costs equaling benefits at the margin. See 
Tom Tietenberg, Environmental Economics and 
Policy 25 (4th ed. 2004); 1 Handbook of 
Environmental Economics: Environmental 
Degradation and Institutional Responses 253-54 
(Karl-Goran Maler & Jeffrey R. Vincent eds. 2003). In 
technical terms, CBA pursues Kaldor-Hicks, rather 
than Pareto, efficiency. The latter standard only 
approves projects that make at least one individual 
better off and no one worse off. The former standard 
approves projects so long as “losers” could, in theory, 
be compensated adequately from project gains 
to make them no worse off. See Joseph Persky, 
Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Classical Creed, 15 J. 
Econ. Perspectives 199, 201 (2001). What this means 
in plain terms is that CBA only seeks to promote 
value as such and does not compensate those who 
lose from the enhancement of efficiency. See Nicholas 
Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economic and 
Inter-personal Comparisons of Utility, 49 Econ. J. 
549, 550 (1939).  
  In order to compare costs and benefits, CBA 
evaluates policy choices’ diverse consequences 
according to a single numerical rubric. Accordingly, 
the framework asks regulators to predict, weight, and 
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aggregate policy impacts in dollar terms. Once 
relevant policy impacts have been estimated and 
monetized in this manner, regulators can use CBA to 
select the point of marginal equivalence between 
social costs and benefits. Similarly, many economists 
and other commentators believe that application of 
CBA to a range of existing and proposed risk 
regulation programs can provide society with a basis 
for making efficient use of the entire regulatory 
budget that it devotes to risk prevention. See 
generally Stephen Breyer, Breaking The Vicious 
Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation (1993). 
  In theory, CBA values anticipated policy effects 
according to the monetary amount that affected 
individuals would be willing to pay if the effect under 
consideration were traded in an economic market. 
See Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is There a Role for 
Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and 
Safety Regulation?, 272 Science 221, 222 (1996). This 
willingness-to-pay approach to valuation makes the 
desirability of CBA’s results contingent on the 
desirability of the underlying distribution of wealth 
and entitlements out of which valuations are being 
generated.  
  Once EPA identifies a technology capable of 
reducing environmental impacts, it can use market 
data to estimate facilities’ compliance costs, which 
constitute the principle direct cost of regulation. 
Neither the consideration of cost nor this approach to 
its valuation is unique to CBA.  
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  Valuation of regulatory benefits – consisting of 
averted harms such as human death and illness, 
species loss, or environmental degradation – poses 
greater challenges. EPA can often choose the best 
technologies for minimizing environmental impacts 
by simply comparing the percentage of effluent or 
water intake reduction of competing technologies. To 
do this, the agency does not need to know anything 
about the quality of adjacent waters.  
  To quantify and monetize the environmental 
benefits a technology might generate, however, EPA 
must consider the quality of adjacent waters and the 
myriad ecological impacts that effluent or water 
intake might have. These values and impacts will 
vary. For waters most in need of environmental 
improvement, the value of benefits may be less than 
for waters that require little protection. Water intake 
technologies may protect few fish in depleted fisheries 
(at least in the short run), but may generate high 
benefits estimates in waters with a thriving fishery.  
  CBA typically entails the monetization of 
quantified benefits based on individual willingness to 
pay. Existing markets will not provide reliable price 
information for such benefits. Accordingly, in the 
environmental context, the CBA practitioner must 
attempt to identify individual valuations of averted 
harms through indirect or hypothetical means. Even 
within the economics profession, much theoretical 
and methodological controversy has surrounded the 
development and use of such valuation techniques. 
See, e.g., Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit 
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Analysis, 29 J. Legal Stud. 931, 949 (2000) 
(strongly criticizing conventional willingness-to-pay 
measurement approaches). 
 
B. By its Nature, Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Cannot Address Many Aspects of Law 
and Policy 
  CBA embraces welfare economic assumptions 
about how value is defined and measured. According 
to economic theory, willingness to pay reflects the 
strength of individual preferences for various goods. 
Use of a methodology based on estimates of private 
preferences for avoiding death, illness, and 
environmental degradation assumes that people’s 
purchase decisions should determine value. See 
Bryan Norton, Robert Costanza, and Richard C. 
Bishop, The Evolution of Preferences: Why ‘Sovereign’ 
Preferences May Not Lead to Sustainable Policies and 
What to Do About It, 24 Ecol. Econ. 193 (1998). Thus, 
the weight assigned to matters as basic as the 
existence of a fish species or the death of a human 
being derives from individualistic market behavior.  
  This contrasts with a model of collective value 
choices, such as political choices that create 
individual rights or give special weight to matters 
deemed fundamentally important for reasons not 
rooted in welfare economics. Cf. Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., 
Comment: Does Benefit Cost Analysis Stand Alone? 
Rights and Standing, 10 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 
96, 96 n.2 (1991) (observing that when uncertainty 
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over legal rights “extends beyond the margin, benefit 
cost analysis will be of little help”); James M. 
Buchanan, Freedom in Constitutional Contract: 
Perspectives of a Political Economist (1977); Laurence 
H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New 
Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 Yale L. J. 
1315 (1974). This Court has implicitly held that 
Congress made such value choices in the Clean Air 
Act and the Endangered Species Act. See TVA v. Hill, 
437 U.S. 153, 176-84 (1978) (recognizing that 
Congress decided to save each endangered species, no 
matter what the cost); Whitman v. American Trucking 
Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001) (recognizing 
that Congress chose, in the Clean Air Act, to protect 
public health). In the CWA, this Court has likewise 
recognized that Congress chose to adopt an 
overarching goal of ecological restoration, U.S. v. 
Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 132-33 
(1985) (describing the CWA as a “comprehensive 
legislative attempt ‘to restore’ ” the waters’ ecological 
integrity), which is served by subsidiary goals of zero 
discharge of pollutants and protection of fish, see 33 
U.S.C. § 1251.  
  When such goals are recognized as politically- or 
normatively-imposed constraints, economic theory 
evaluates them under frameworks that are 
analytically distinct from conventional cost-benefit 
optimization. For instance, an extensive economic 
literature exists analyzing environmental and 
natural resource decisionmaking under 
“sustainability” or “safe minimum standard” 
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constraints. See, e.g., Alan Randall & Michael C. 
Farmer, Benefits, Costs and the Safe Minimum 
Standard of Conservation, in The Handbook of 
Environmental Economics 26 (Daniel Bromley ed. 
1995); Richard B. Howarth, Sustainability Under 
Uncertainty: A Deontological Approach, 71 Land 
Econ. 417 (1995); Richard B. Norgaard & Richard B. 
Howarth, Sustainability and Discounting the Future, 
in Ecological Economics: The Science and 
Management of Sustainability 88 (Robert Costanza 
ed. 1991); Richard C. Bishop, Endangered Species 
and Uncertainty: The Economics of a Safe Minimum 
Standard, 60 Am. J. Ag. Econ. 10 (1978). 
  Taking the ecological restoration goal seriously 
requires efforts on a variety of fronts when the 
immediate benefits produced are small. CBA, 
however, calls for scaling down efforts when resources 
are in serious trouble, because then individual 
actions produce small measurable marginal benefits. 
Furthermore, the ecological restoration goal requires 
confronting the complex, causally interrelated nature 
of ecosystems, which often frustrates attempts to 
manage for allocative efficiency. See Orrin H. Pilkey 
& Linda Pilkey Jarvis, Useless Arithmetic 6-7, 10-21 
(2007) (explaining how reliance on widely used 
mathematical models to set sustainable catch levels 
led to a fisheries collapse). CBA, for instance, 
struggles to address catastrophic or non-linear 
potentialities, since CBA typically assumes a smooth 
continuous world in which median expectation values 
provide reasonably reliable decision criteria. Martin 
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Weitzman, The Stern Review of the Economics of 
Climate Change, 45 J. Econ. Lit. 703 (2007) 
(questioning the value of conventional CBA in the 
face of climate change’s deep structural uncertainty 
and potentially extreme worst case consequences). 
  Even assuming complete and reliable 
information, CBA would not prove useful in all law 
and policy contexts. Any formal decisionmaking 
system such as CBA must – by its very nature – 
exclude from evaluation some relevant parameters of 
the decisions that the system aims to resolve. CBA 
may be appropriate in some circumstances, but it is 
not an alternative to foundational political choices 
like those found in the Constitution and, in some 
cases, in environmental law. It is imperative, 
therefore, to recognize that CBA cannot be “read into” 
all of a society’s statutes or viewed as an all-purpose 
policy device. Cf. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 
U.S. 604, 626 (1990) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) 
(criticizing “totality of the circumstances” and 
“freestanding ‘reasonableness’ ” tests in the due 
process context and warning against “injecting them 
into the core of our American practice”). 
 
II. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IS NOT 
RELEVANT TO IDENTIFICATION OF THE 
BEST TECHNOLOGY AVAILABLE FOR 
MINIMIZING ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT 
  As Congress’s agent, EPA must follow statutory 
instructions establishing policies for EPA rulemaking. 
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Therefore, when used to implement specific statutes, 
EPA’s economic analysis must examine the factors 
that congressional policies make relevant, without 
considering factors irrelevant to its instructions. 
See Donovan, 452 U.S. at 507-12 (holding that 
cost-benefit analysis is not a relevant factor when 
a statute demands maximum feasible emission 
reductions); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. 
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411-13 (1971) (holding that 
cost-benefit balancing was not among the relevant 
factors for determining whether it was “feasible” to 
route a highway around a park); Union Electric Co. v. 
EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257-65 (1976) (holding that cost is 
not a relevant factor in EPA assessment of state 
implementation plans under the Clean Air Act). The 
relationship of costs to benefits is not among the 
factors relevant to determining the “best technology 
available for minimizing adverse environmental 
impact.” 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b). 
 
A. Engineering Analysis Identifies the 
“Best” Technology for Minimizing 
Adverse Environmental Impact 
  Identification of the “best technology . . . for 
minimizing environmental impacts” requires an 
engineering analysis of competing technologies’ 
environmental performance characteristics. In the 
effluent reduction context, the “best” technologies 
generally minimize the amount of water pollution 
being discharged. See Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 74 
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(describing BAT as committing “the maximum 
resources economically possible to the” pollution 
elimination goal); see also Alaska, 540 U.S. at 489-90 
n.13 (describing requirements for “best available 
control technology” as requiring “the technology that 
can best reduce pollution within practical 
constraints”) (emphasis added). The focus on water 
intake in § 316(b) generally requires an inverse 
analysis focused on identifying technologies that 
minimize the amount of water taken from lakes, 
streams, and rivers to cool industrial facilities. As a 
rule, technologies minimizing water intake kill less 
fish and disrupt a water body’s ecology less than 
technologies that use more water. See Riverkeeper II, 
475 F.3d at 101 n.16 (noting EPA’s general 
assumption that reductions in water flow 
proportionally reduce impingement and 
entrainment); Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 194 (“EPA 
acknowledges that dry cooling” virtually eliminates 
water intake and “dramatically reduces impingement 
and entrainment”).  
  The analysis of which technologies minimize 
adverse environmental impacts may take into 
account a broad range of impacts. EPA may, for 
example, take into account adverse air pollution 
impacts associated with water pollution technology. 
See, e.g., Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 194-95 (allowing 
EPA to consider the air pollution associated with 
energy efficiency penalties for dry cooling technology 
as a basis for rejecting it); Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d 
at 99 n.11 (describing its prior decision to uphold 
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EPA’s rejection of dry cooling as based on its negative 
environmental effects and unbearable cost). The 
amount of economic cost a facility will incur to install 
a technology, such as an environmentally superior 
water intake system, has no bearing on the question 
of which technology minimizes adverse 
environmental impacts.  
  Market participants generally use the term 
“best” in conjunction with any technology to signify 
the highest quality item regardless of cost. See 
generally Bailey v. U.S., 516 U.S. 137, 144-45 (1995) 
(holding that courts must give a term its ordinary 
meaning considering not just its “bare meaning,” but 
also its “placement and purpose” in context). Thus, 
consumer discussions of whether a Blackberry or an 
I-Phone is the “best” cell phone or whether an Apple 
or a PC is the “best” computer focus on design and 
features, i.e. on figuring out which technology works 
best for its intended purpose. Similarly, advertisers 
use the term “best” as a signifier of high quality. See, 
e.g., Bradley Johnson & Alice Z. Cuneo, AT&T, 
Goodby Look to Ax mLife, Advertising Age, July 14, 
2003, at 1, 26 (contrasting advertisements focused on 
price with the claim that AT&T has the “best 
technology”); Ad Spending of ‘100’ Edges Upward, 
Advertising Age, Sept. 28, 1988, at 36 (describing Bell 
Atlantic as having the “best technology” because its 
telecommunications capabilities are the “fastest, with 
the most interesting applications.”).  
  Economists, however, sometimes use the term 
“best policy” as signifying a balance between cost and 
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benefits. And, similarly, consumers sometimes use the 
term “best purchase” to signify a balance between 
costs and benefits. But the term “best technology,” in 
ordinary parlance, means the best technology for its 
intended purpose – here minimizing (not just 
addressing) environmental impacts.  
 
B. Economic Analysis Comparing Costs 
to Facilities’ Economic Capabilities 
Evaluates a Technology’s “Availability” 
  However, § 316(b) qualifies its demand that EPA 
formulate standards based upon the environmentally 
best technologies by insisting that the technologies be 
“available.” 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b). A technology that is 
technically or economically infeasible may not be 
available. See National Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 75 
(describing the best available technology provisions 
as requiring employment of the “best measures 
economically and technologically feasible”); Driesen, 
Feasibility Principle, supra, at 21 (describing BAT 
requirements as exemplars of the feasibility principle, 
which maximizes reductions except when doing so 
causes widespread plant shutdowns). Accordingly, 
EPA properly employs economic analysis to determine 
whether a technology is available.  
  Economic analysis focused on technological 
availability models the relationship of costs to 
regulated facility owners’ economic capabilities. See 
Alaska, 540 U.S. at 498 (upholding EPA’s rejection of 
a disproportionate cost argument, because a finding 
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of economic infeasibility requires financial data, 
which the regulated firm withheld). This financial 
analysis of an industry, combined with an analysis of 
technical feasibility (whether the technology works 
properly for the industry as a whole), allows the 
agency to determine the limits of firms’ capabilities. 
See Donovan, 452 U.S. at 508-09 (defining feasible 
regulation as that which is “capable of being done 
. . . ”); see, e.g., Riverkeeper I, 358 F.2d at 195 (EPA 
found “dry cooling” technically infeasible for some 
facilities). Thus, in regulating water intake, EPA 
compared the costs of technologies reducing water 
intake to the revenues of the regulated facilities, 
Final Rule EBA, supra, at B2 (analyzing cost to 
revenue ratios at the firm and facility level); 
Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 194 n.21 (discussing the 
percentage of revenue necessary to fund “dry cooling” 
technology), in order to evaluate whether 
environmentally desirable technologies were 
economically available to the industry, see id. at 195 
(EPA found that dry cooling requirements for new 
facilities would discourage their construction); 
Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 99 n.11 (characterizing 
Riverkeeper I approval of EPA’s rejection of dry 
cooling as “ultimately” based on EPA finding dry 
cooling “too expensive for industry to reasonably 
bear” and air pollution impacts); see also 
Pet.App.272a-273a (69 Fed. Reg. at 41,608-09) 
(finding dry cooling unavailable for existing facilities 
because it “carries costs that would potentially 
cause significant closures.”). If the cost of an 
environmentally valuable technology creates a 
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long-term excess of cost over revenue, requiring that 
technology may lead to bankruptcy and/or the 
shutdown of facilities. See Effluent Limitations for the 
Meat and Poultry Products Point Source Category, 69 
Fed. Reg. 54,476, 54,511, 54,514 (September 8, 2004) 
(closure comes from regulation producing “negative 
long-term earnings” at the facility or company level). 
A rule that shuts down a significant portion of an 
industry does not cause the technology to be 
employed, because it may not be economically 
available to the industry as a whole.5  
  Accordingly, in evaluating technological 
availability, EPA frequently uses economic models 
focused on industry finances. See, e.g., National 
Wildlife Federation (NWF) v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 565 
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (discussing EPA’s use of the Altman 
bankruptcy model); Effluent Limitations for the Iron 
and Steel Manufacturing Source Category, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 64,216, 64,244 (October 17, 2002) (Iron & Steel) 
(EPA selected Altman’s Z model to evaluate 
bankruptcy possibilities after a review of corporate 
financial distress models in the economic literature). 
 
  5 Likewise, if the compliance cost associated with a 
technology required of new sources becomes so onerous that new 
facilities do not open, it might be correct to say that the 
technology is not “available” to new facilities. See Effluent 
Limitations for the Industrial Laundries Point Source Category, 
Withdrawal of Proposed Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,072, 45,079 
(August 18, 1999) (EPA conducts a “ ‘barrier-to-entry analysis’ to 
determine whether . . . compliance costs would have prevented a 
new source from entering the market.”). 
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Financial analysts and others use financial models to 
evaluate whether a projected cost increment might 
bankrupt firms and/or lead to facility closures. See 
Edward A. Altman & Edith Hotchkiss, Corporate 
Financial Distress and Bankruptcy 234-35 (2006) 
(discussing financial institutions’ use of models to 
predict repayment risk). Such models may take into 
account earnings, assets, liabilities, and other factors 
relevant to predicting bankruptcy or closures. See id. 
at 241-43 (discussing model components). 
  Economists use a concept of price elasticity to 
analyze the question of when facility owners must 
bear costs imposed on them in order to avoid sales 
declines or, instead, will succeed in passing them on 
to customers. See, e.g., Effluent Limitations for the 
Metal Products and Machinery Point Source Category 
Notice of Data Availability, 67 Fed. Reg. 38,752, 
38,769 (June 5, 2002) (Metal Products) (stating that 
EPA estimated the “cost elasticity of price.”). For 
goods and services with few or no substitutes, 
consumer demand may remain steady even as prices 
rise. See Effluent Limitations for the Transportation 
Equipment Cleaning Point Source Category, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 49,666, 49,688 (August 14, 2000) (predicting that 
price increases would cause little decline in output in 
a sector offering an essential service). Industry 
competitiveness is also relevant to a firm’s ability to 
pass on costs and, thus, EPA employs econometric 
models and analyzes market structure to estimate 
how much of projected regulatory cost facilities must 
actually pay. See, e.g., Metal Products, 67 Fed. Reg. at 
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38,768-69. Price rises reflecting regulatory costs, 
if significant and not shared by all relevant 
competitors, can cause a firm to lose market share, 
another possible route to bankruptcy. Cf. Adam B. 
Jaffe et al., Environmental Regulation and the 
Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing, What Does 
the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. Econ. Lit. 132, 157 (1995) 
(environmental regulation has little impact on U.S. 
competitiveness); Pharmaceutical Manufacturing 
Category Effluent Limitations Final Rule, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 50,388, 50,408 (September 21, 1998) 
(Pharmaceutical Manufacturing) (analyzing whether 
rule might encourage new facilities to locate outside 
the United States). In sum, financial models provide 
tools for evaluating the many economic factors 
associated with assessing a technology’s economic 
availability to an industry. See Metal Products, 67 
Fed. Reg. at 38,770-71 (discussing several different 
models).  
  This availability requirement has imposed 
significant restraints on the EPA’s ability to require 
the best technologies. Courts have remanded rules to 
EPA when it failed to adequately consider 
affordability in cases where there might be a serious 
issue in that regard. See, e.g., National Renderers 
Ass’n v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1281, 1288-89 (8th Cir. 1976) 
(finding a water pollution rule arbitrary because EPA 
did not adequately consider whether costs would 
affect the economic viability of medium-sized 
facilities). And EPA has sometimes refused to require 
the best performing technology, when it determines 
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that a rule based on that technology will close a large 
number of facilities. See, e.g., id. at 1288 & n.7 
(noting that EPA exempted small facilities from its 
rule, because it predicted many of them would 
otherwise close); NWF, 286 F.3d at 565 (accepting 
EPA’s conclusion that a particular technology is not 
achievable because requiring it would lead to 
bankruptcies).  
  Analysis of the relationship between costs and 
benefits does not reveal whether a technology is 
economically available. See Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturing, 63 Fed. Reg. at 50,403 (stating that 
the agency’s economic analysis includes “the impacts 
of these rules” on firms and “also” a cost-benefit 
analysis) (emphasis added); Effluent Limitations for 
the Industrial Laundries Point Source Category, 64 
Fed. Reg. 45,072, 45,078 (August 18, 1999) 
(describing evaluation of facility closures, firm 
failures, and cost-benefit analysis as separate 
components of its economic assessment); Iron and 
Steel, 67 Fed Reg. at 64,243 (describing an evaluation 
of “corporate financial distress” and cost-benefit 
analysis as separate components of a regulatory 
impact analysis). Instead, CBA shifts the focus from 
availability to a broad question about whether 
pollution control is desirable in a given instance, a 
question not mentioned in section 316(b). See 
Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 98 n.10 (citing OMB 
Circular A-94, Guidelines and Discount Rates for 
Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, Appendix 
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A (1992)) (CBA is a method of assessing a policy’s 
desirability) (emphasis added).  
  To see CBA’s irrelevance to technological 
availability, consider a simplified example in which a 
firm generating $500,000 in annual revenue must 
employ an environmental technology requiring $1 
million in additional annual cost. This cost produces 
$10 million in incremental annual monetized 
environmental benefits. Because annual cost exceeds 
annual revenue, this technology is not economically 
available to the firm, but requiring this technology 
would be economically efficient, because the overall 
benefits to society exceed the costs. Conversely, 
imagine that the same $1 million annual incremental 
expenditure occurs at a facility generating $1 billion 
in annual revenue, but generates only $1,000 in 
annual incremental benefits. In this case, the 
measure may be economically available to the facility, 
but a rule based on it would be economically 
inefficient (assuming that all environmental benefits 
have been accurately estimated and appropriately 
valued). In each case, conclusions about a 
technology’s availability hinge on analysis of the 
firm’s finances rather than on the relationship 
between costs and benefits. Financial analysis of costs’ 
predicted impacts on regulated firms’ operations in 
light of their economic capabilities provides useful 
information about a technology’s economic availability. 
Monetization and quantification of benefits provides 
no information relevant to assessing a technology’s 
economic availability.  
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  Economic analysis of the question of whether a 
proposed rule will trigger plant shutdowns focuses 
upon the distribution, not the total amount, of costs. 
Cf. I A Legislative History of the Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Comm. Print 1973) 
(Leg. Hist.) at 156, 217, 352-53, 375, 452, 456-57, 
467, 480, 513-15, 561, 564-65, 613, 656-58, 731-33, 
735-36, 738, 743-45, 1128-29, 1143, 1157, 1173, 1215, 
1286, 1353-55, 1358-61 (showing overwhelming 
Congressional focus on the job loss issue). A high cost 
imposed on a very profitable facility might lead to 
employment increases, as plant managers hire 
technicians to install and operate equipment reducing 
environmental impacts. See Goodstein, supra, at 171. 
Conversely, a relatively modest cost imposed on a 
marginal facility might lead to a shutdown, causing 
significant unemployment. Hence, economic models 
that compare costs to facilities’ economic capabilities 
implicitly focus on cost distribution.  
  Not only does analysis of direct job losses require 
a form of analysis focused on cost distribution rather 
than aggregate costs and benefits, but the concern 
about job loss itself constitutes a distributional 
concern. See Driesen, Feasibility Principle, at 35-37. A 
complete loss of income constitutes a heavily 
concentrated cost for the worker losing a job, having a 
significant impact on the worker concerned. See id. at 
37 (describing the impact). The same amount of cost 
producing widespread but modest price increases 
usually does not implicate Congressional concerns 
about immediate plant shutdowns. See id. at 35-36 
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(explaining why widely distributed costs tend to have 
insignificant impacts). Congressional focus on 
availability thus reflects political concern for costs’ 
distribution, rather than maximization of net 
benefits.  
  Economic theory recognizes that cost-benefit 
analysis, because of its focus on economic efficiency, 
does not resolve distributional questions. See 
Jonathan Lesser, Daniel Dodds & Richard Zerbe, Jr., 
Environmental Economics and Policy 211 (1997) 
(recognizing the rationality of pursuit of “non-economic 
goals,” such as equity); Arrow et al., supra, at 221 
(describing “concerns about fairness” as “important 
noneconomic factors that merit consideration”). 
Quantification and monetization of benefits does not 
help to analyze the distributional concerns implicated 
by the legislature’s emphasis on technological 
availability.  
 
C. Cost-Benefit Analysis Is Irrelevant to 
Cost Effectiveness Analysis 
  The Second Circuit held that EPA may consider 
“cost effectiveness” in crafting its standards. 
Riverkeeper I, 475 F.3d at 98 (Congress intended that 
EPA use cost effectiveness analysis in designing BAT 
standards). Cost effectiveness analysis identifies the 
cheapest means of achieving a predetermined goal. 
Id. at 98 n.10 (citing OMB Circular A-94) (describing 
cost effectiveness as a “systematic quantitative 
method for comparing the costs of alternative means 
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of achieving the same . . . given objective.”). Concerns 
about cost effectiveness motivate a very substantial 
economic literature on the form of regulation, and lie 
behind economists’ support for pollution taxes and 
emissions trading. See, e.g., Lesser, Dodds & Zerbe, 
Jr., supra, at 231-33; W.D. Montgomery, Markets in 
Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs, 5 
J. Econ. Theory 395 (1972).  
  The economic literature teaches that cost 
effectiveness analysis does not involve monetization 
or quantification of benefits and is therefore 
analytically distinct from CBA.6 To carry out a cost 
effectiveness analysis, EPA must identify and 
compare the cost of several technologies or 
approaches capable of meeting its previously 
determined goal. Under § 316(b), this previously 
determined goal is the minimization of adverse 
environmental impacts from cooling water intake and 
it is pursued through evaluation of the environmental 
capabilities of various available technologies.  
  EPA may establish a performance standard based 
on the best available technology’s capabilities, while 
 
  6 See, e.g., Scott Callan & Janet Thomas, Environmental 
Economics & Management: Theory, Policy, and Applications 170 
(4th ed. 2007); Barry Field, Environmental Economics: An 
Introduction 13 (1994); Ahmed Hussen, Principles Of 
Environmental Economics 188 (2d ed. 2000); Lesser, Dodds & 
Zerbe, Jr., supra, at 230; Roger Perman, Yue Ma & James 
McGilvray, Natural Resource and Environmental Economics 222 
(1996); Clifford Russell, Applying Economics to the Environment 
117 (2001); Tietenberg, supra, at 48-50.  
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allowing facilities to use technologies other than the 
technology EPA identified as the best, including 
technologies invented after the rule’s promulgation, 
to meet the standard. See generally Tietenberg, 
supra, at 48-49. This approach invites facility owners 
to carry out a cost effectiveness analysis to determine 
which technologies provide the cheapest means of 
achieving agency goals. Regulated firms usually have 
better information than EPA does about the marginal 
cost of employing various technologies at their own 
plants. This “information asymmetry” supports EPA’s 
practice of allowing firms some flexibility in choosing 
technologies to meet EPA standards. See generally 
Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the 
Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 
Am. Econ. Rev. 393, 404 (1980) (discussing market 
implications of information asymmetry). But the ratio 
of costs to benefits has no bearing on whether a 
particular approach offers the cheapest way to meet a 
predetermined goal. See Clifford Russell, Applying 
Economics to the Environment 112-13 (2001) 
(describing cost-effectiveness as “an application of 
constrained optimization” that provides an 
alternative to CBA); Wallace E. Oates, From Research 
to Policy: The Case of Environmental Economics, 2000 
U. Ill. L. Rev. 135, 135 (noting that standards under 
the CWA are to be set “with little regard to their 
economic implications”).  
  The distinction between CBA and cost 
effectiveness analysis is especially important in a 
system of distributed political power, where one 
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governmental body might wish to delegate only part 
of its authority to another. Whereas petitioners and 
their supporters analogize regulatory CBA to 
“everyday life” decisions such as the purchase of an 
automobile, Federal Brief at 13, the better analogy is 
to decisions in which authority, resources, expertise, 
and responsibility are spread among multiple parties. 
In such contexts, individuals might properly hesitate 
to confer authority on agents to seek overall 
efficiency. 
  For instance, a client might delegate decisions 
about how to litigate a case to an attorney, but 
reserve to itself the decision about when to settle in 
light of anticipated costs and benefits. Or a parent 
might offer to purchase the automobile of a teenage 
child’s choosing, but still limit the extent to which the 
child could trade off safety for other factors like speed 
or styling. A rational policymaker might choose in 
these contexts not to delegate authority to seek 
overall efficiency, but instead to establish more 
specific policies to guide the agent’s decisionmaking. 
See I Leg. Hist. at 518-19 & n.1 (showing 
Congressional consideration of CBA). 
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III. EPA’S COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
ILLUSTRATES WHY CONGRESS MAY 
RATIONALLY HAVE REJECTED ITS USE 
IN § 316(B) 
  Although now generally cited as an unequivocal 
supporter of CBA, Professor Sunstein has argued 
both that “there is a large difference between CBA 
and standards of feasibility or achievability,” and that 
the latter “might be preferred . . . on the ground that 
they greatly ease the agency’s task, and in a way that 
makes people far better off on balance.” Cass R. 
Sunstein, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis for Everyone?, 53 
Admin. L. Rev. 299, 311 (2001). EPA’s attempt to 
transform the feasibility standard of § 316(b) into a 
cost-benefit standard supports Professor Sunstein’s 
claim.  
 
A. Incomplete Information Made the Phase 
II Cost-Benefit Analysis Unreliable 
  In the Phase II rulemaking, EPA focused on 
“reductions in impingement and entrainment as a 
quick, certain, and consistent metric for determining 
performance.” Pet.App.169a (69 Fed. Reg. at 41,586). 
Increased fish survival became the primary 
determining factor of the rulemaking because – at 
least for those fish that are commercially or 
recreationally valuable – that factor offered an 
ecological benefit that was readily quantifiable and 
monetizable. 
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  As the agency acknowledged, however, the 
potential impact of cooling water intake structures is 
much broader and more complex than these 
quantified mortality effects. See EPA, Regional 
Analysis Document for the Final Section 316(b) Phase 
II Existing Facilities Rule, EPA-821-R-02-003, 
February 12, 2004, at A9-1 (Final Rule RS) 
(documenting numerous ways in which “the 
organisms lost to [impingement and entrainment] 
are critical to the continued functioning of the 
ecosystems of which they are a part” and in which 
those ecosystems provide valuable “ecological and 
public services”).7 Among these broader impacts 
was an unknown but nontrivial level of harm 
posed to threatened or endangered species. See 
Pet.App.173a-174a (69 Fed. Reg. at 41,587). 
  Such additional environmental impacts, however, 
received no monetary value in EPA’s economic 
analysis. Indeed, as the agency candidly admitted, 
even its focus on impingement and entrainment 
losses was highly incomplete, as it only accounted for 
losses insofar as they impacted commercial and 
recreational fish harvests; hence, the agency “was not 
able to monetize benefits for 98.2% of the age-one 
equivalent losses of all commercial, recreational, and 
forage species for the section 316(b) Phase II 
regulation.” Final Rule EBA, supra, at C3-2. See also 
 
  7 This document is available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
waterscience/316b/phase2/casestudy/final.htm. 
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Pet.App.499a (69 Fed. Reg. at 41,661) (“The Agency’s 
direct use valuation does not account for the benefits 
from the remaining 98.2% of the age 1 equivalent 
aquatic organisms estimated to be protected 
nationally under today’s rule.”). 
  In light of such incompleteness and uncertainty, 
the agency warned that “[t]o rely only on estimated 
use values would substantially undervalue the 
benefits of the final section 316(b) rule.” Final Rule 
RS, supra, at A9-8. Elsewhere, the agency offered the 
sage advice that “[a] comparison of complete costs 
and incomplete benefits does not provide an accurate 
picture of net benefits to society,” Final Rule EBA, 
supra, at D1-5, and that “there is a real possibility 
that ignoring non-use values could result in serious 
misallocation of resources,” Pet.App.499a (69 Fed. 
Reg. at 41,660). Nevertheless, the agency ultimately 
appeared to give these unquantified benefits no 
weight in its conclusion about whether closed cycle 
cooling was acceptable. See Final Rule EBA, supra, at 
D1-4 (mentioning only monetized benefits). 
  With so many effects remaining off the balance 
sheet, regulators had little reason to be confident 
that the conclusions offered by CBA were 
welfare-maximizing. Instead, alternative, more 
stringent standards of environmental protection 
might have been preferable to the CBA-based 
approach, given the many non-quantified 
environmental benefits of cooling water intake 
reduction. See Frank Ackerman, Comments on 
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Proposed Rule (August 1, 2002) at 9 tbl. 2, J.A. at 296 
(discussing additional ecological impacts).  
 
B. As Traditionally Understood and 
Implemented, the Technology-Based 
Standard of § 316(b) Would Have 
Avoided Limitations of EPA’s 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
  Even within the terms of welfare economics, 
non-efficiency maximizing policy approaches such as 
technology-based standards may appear desirable 
when evaluated in real world policy contexts, where 
information is incomplete and uncertain, where 
administrative resources are limited, and where 
technology is dynamically impacted by law itself. See, 
e.g., Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When is 
Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions, 
Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of 
Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental 
Protection, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 887, 888-89 (observing 
that historical, technological, and institutional factors 
can occasionally render technology-based approaches 
“the most efficient means of achieving a society’s 
environmental protection goals”); Juan-Pablo 
Montero, Pollution Markets with Imperfectly 
Observed Emissions, 36 RAND J. Econ. 645 (2005) 
(demonstrating that when regulators can accurately 
monitor abatement technology but not emissions and 
output levels, standard-based approaches may 
outperform alternatives under certain market 
conditions). 
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  Such second-best considerations are at the heart 
of the CWA, given the great difficulty experienced 
attempting to identify and enforce standards prior to 
the 1972 amendments. Cf. J. H. Dales, Pollution, 
Property & Prices: An Essay in Policy-making and 
Economics 39 (1968) (a leading economist’s 
statement, prior to the Act’s passage, that an 
economist cannot say that one policy is superior to 
another because he “is quite unable to draw up a neat 
table showing all benefits and costs”). As is well 
recognized, Congress’s general approach in the 
amendments was to circumvent the informational 
demands, scientific uncertainties, and valuation 
questions that had frustrated the task of basing 
standards for dischargers on the effect of pollution on 
water quality. See EPA v. State Water Resources 
Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 202-03 (1976). 
  Because the language of § 316(b) closely 
resembles the language of the most stringent 
technology-based standards in the CWA, EPA should 
have focused simply on the affordability of 
increasingly efficacious environmental control 
technologies, recognizing that Congress itself already 
had determined that the benefits of cooling water 
intake regulation are sufficiently vast and difficult to 
quantify that only the “best” control technology will 
suffice. Instead, EPA essentially relived the failed 
pre-1972 experience under the CWA through its failed 
effort to complete a reliable CBA of the Phase II 
rulemaking. 
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  In this respect, it is useful to recall that the 
stated goal of the CWA is “to restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). The goal is not 
to view those waters as merely contingent resources, 
to be impaired or sacrificed at any moment for the 
promotion of an abstract and undifferentiated 
maximization of welfare.  
  Earlier, EPA seemed to recognize that allowing 
the degraded condition of a water body to reduce the 
level of legal protection that it receives – as the agency 
ultimately decided to allow through its CBA-based 
approach – would be inconsistent with the CWA’s more 
dynamic, long-term goal of progressively restoring the 
ecological integrity of the nation’s water bodies. Cf. 
Thomas O. McGarity, Media-Quality, Technology, and 
Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for Health and 
Environmental Regulation, 46 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 159, 199 n.194 (1983) (quoting Senator Bayh 
as explaining that the technology-based standards of 
the CWA were intended to “force industry to do the 
best job it can do to clean up the nation’s water and to 
keep making progress without incurring such 
massive costs that economic chaos would result”). 
When offering its proposed Phase II rule, for instance, 
EPA stated that, in addition to expressly quantified 
impacts, it was “concerned about the cumulative 
overall degradation of the aquatic environment as a 
consequence of . . . intakes located with or adjacent to 
an impaired waterbody.” See 67 Fed. Reg. 17,122, 
17,136 (April 9, 2002).  
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  Conversely, a “comprehensive . . . attempt ‘to 
restore’ ” the ecological integrity of waters, Bayview 
Homes, 474 U.S. at 132-33 (1985), through pollution 
controls, wetlands conservation, and other measures 
should increase fish populations, and therefore the 
value of the benefits of technology reducing water 
intake, over time. See EPA, Economic and Benefits 
Analysis for the Proposed Section 316(b) Phase II 
Existing Facilities Rule, EPA-821-R-02-001, February 
2002, at C1-6, item 5.18 (acknowledging likely 
underestimation of benefits because current water 
quality has improved since the 20-year-old data relied 
upon was generated). Through its subtle shift from 
expressing concern over the impact of cooling water 
intake structures on impaired water bodies to using 
estimated impairment levels as an efficiency-oriented 
rationale for lowering levels of protection, EPA 
seemed to abandon the CWA’s mandate to 
progressively restructure the economic and 
technological landscape that gives rise to any 
momentary depiction of costs and benefits. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
 
  8 This document is available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
waterscience/316b/phase2/econbenefits/ (last visited September 
30, 2008). 
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CONCLUSION 
  Regulators should use economic methods 
appropriate to the decision before them. CBA 
provides a tool for choosing allocatively efficient 
regulation. Other modes of economic analysis, 
however, fit a mandate to minimize environmental 
impacts within the limits of available technology. 
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